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Abstract 
In January 2008, the Ronald Coase Institute conducted the First Asia Workshop 
on Institutional Analysis, in partnership with the Lee Kuan Yew School of Public 
Policy and the Asia Competitiveness Institute of the National University of 
Singapore. This report highlights the general theme of the workshop: that well-
functioning institutions are fundamental to development. This is shown by 
summarising two studies presented at the workshop and by contrasting two 
countries from Southeast Asia, i.e., the Philippines and Singapore. 
Keywords: institutional economics, Philippines, Singapore, democracy, bureauc-
racy, Ronald Coase Institute. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
In just roughly 50 years since it declared independence,1 Singapore has skyrock-
eted to first-world status and has become the only Southeast Asian country in the 
top 25 of the Human Development Index.2 What makes this achievement incredible 
—————————————————— 
* Thanks are due to the Ronald Coase Institute for the fellowship and to the Ruhr Graduate 
School in Economics (RGS Econ) for the financial assistance. Correspondence: RGS Econ, 
Hohenzollernstr. 1-3, 45128 Essen, Germany; e-mail: paloyo@rwi-essen.de. 
1 Singapore separated from Malaysia on 9 August 1965. 
2 The Human Development Index is a measure of well-being published by the United 
Nations Development Programme. It uses a weighted average of life expectancy at birth, adult 
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is that the initial conditions under which Singapore started its ascent to the top 
were just as challenging as those that were observed to prevail in other develop-
ing countries which have thus far remained underdeveloped. When it gained 
independence from Malaysia, the tiny city-state was reeling from a mass unem-
ployment crisis and the socio-cultural balance was delicate. 
The economic advancement of Singapore is widely attributed to the effective-
ness of its political leadership. From the beginning, then Prime Minister Lee Kuan 
Yew successfully tackled a laundry list of problems with the help of a strong 
public sector that was practically immune to corruption (Neo and Chen, 2007). 
The institutions – or ‘rules of the game’, as defined by Douglass North (1993) – 
that materialised under the direction of its political establishment made Singapore 
a paragon worthy of emulation by other countries. Like a lighthouse to which 
wandering ships impute navigational guidance, Singapore exemplified, for the 
citizens of the developing world, what is possible if only the poor institutional 
dynamics prevailing in their societies improve and allow each of their ships to 
safely reach port. Even now, it serves as a ‘Camelot’ that ‘possesses an ethos that 
subverts the mediocrity and mendacity that otherwise pervade many aspects of 
social and intellectual life’ (de Dios, 2007) elsewhere.3 
It is therefore no surprise that the Ronald Coase Institute (RCI) chose Singa-
pore as the venue for the First Asia Workshop on Institutional Analysis. In 
Singapore, institutions just work; for example, in the annual ‘Doing Business’ 
report of the World Bank, Singapore outperformed all other countries overall, 
while the Philippines, in contrast, ranked 140th.4 Appropriately, the RCI part-
nered with the Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy and the Asia 
Competitiveness Institute of the National University of Singapore in bringing to 
reality its first workshop conducted in Asia. Without a doubt, institutional change 
could have profound impacts on the development of economies in this region. It is 
commendable that the RCI has brought institutional analysis closer to scholars 
working in Asia and the rest of the developing world, because these are the same 
people whose access to ‘local knowledge’ can contribute richly both to the 
advancement of the discipline of New Institutional Economics itself and to the 
economic and social progress of their own countries. 
—————————————————— 
literacy rate, gross school enrollment ratio and gross domestic product per capita at purchasing 
power parity. In the 2007 edition, Singapore is ranked 25th, between Greece (24th) and South 
Korea (26th). The closest Southeast Asian country is oil-rich Brunei, ranked 30th. 
3 This remark was made by Emmanuel S. de Dios, Dean of the University of the 
Philippines School of Economics (UPSE). He describes how Raul V. Fabella, his immediate 
predecessor, thinks of the UPSE. It applies equally well to the case of Singapore and its 
relationship with its neighbours. 
4 The World Bank publishes an annual report, ‘Doing Business’, that ‘provides objective 
measures of business regulations and their enforcement across 181 economies and selected 
cities at the subnational and regional level.’ 
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The rest of the report is structured as follows. Section 2 provides an overview 
of the participants and faculty. Section 3 contains a brief summary and discussion 
of two selected presentations, one by faculty (3.1) and the other by students (3.2). 
A discussion can be found in the last section (4). 
2. FACULTY AND PARTICIPANTS 
At the outset, it was obvious that the workshop benefited from the diversity of the 
participants. With 21 scholars from all corners of the globe, the substance of the 
perspectives brought into the presentations and discussions was almost tangible. 
Participants came from Burkina Faso, China, Indonesia, Japan, Peru, the Philip-
pines and Venezuela to name a few countries. The locations of the academic 
institutions where the scholars obtained or are currently pursuing their training 
increased the geographic scope of the workshop to include France, Germany, 
South Korea, the UK and the US. The varying academic backgrounds were also 
notable: while most were trained as economists, a few came from the fields of 
law, urban planning and public administration. 
In view of this composition, it comes as no surprise that the presentations 
covered a wide range of topics, ranging from brownfield.5 redevelopment in China 
(Ai and Luan, 2008) and legal institutional evolution (Huang, 2008) to foreign aid 
(Sato, 2008; Kangoye, 2008) and comparative constitutional histories (Cordeiro, 
2008). In the face of such a diversity of subjects it is difficult to find any sort of 
commonality other than two: (a) the implicit or usually explicit importance that is 
attributed to institutions, whether as a determinant of some other variable deemed 
to be important or as a primal object of analysis itself; and (b) the language of the 
discourse, which is couched in the jargon of economics, thereby reinforcing its 
status as the queen of the social sciences. 
The methodologies employed by the scholars were also varied. Some relied on 
game-theoretic modeling, such as Huang (2008) in her paper that dealt with the 
transition occurring in a society from relations-based ‘contracting’ to actual legal 
contracts. Elements of game theory were also used in the papers of Li (2008), 
examining pre- and post-payment in restaurants, and Zhong and Shen (2008), 
studying small and medium-scale state-owned enterprises in China. Andrade 
(2008) fruitfully used microeconometric techniques to examine the impact of a 
court decentralisation programme on women’s well-being in Peru. Econometrics 
was also a principal tool of choice for Lim (Decker and Lim, 2008): using cross-
section and panel datasets, they examined whether democracies grew faster than 
non-democracies. Du and Ye (2008) discussed incentive contracts in a mixed 
—————————————————— 
5 A brownfield is a piece of land that used to serve an industrial or some other commercial 
purpose and is contaminated by pollutants or hazardous waste. 
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duopoly setting where they drew results from an experimental model. Other 
researchers did not use traditional economic techniques.6 
Multiplicity in the choice of methodology is possible at very few conferences 
organised by economists. So far, it has only been the sub-discipline of economics 
called New Institutional Economics (NIE) that has completely embraced an 
interdisciplinary approach to studying social phenomena. While, for example, the 
economics of crime incorporates ideas from psychology and sociology, and 
behavioural economics from (yet again) psychology and neuroscience, NIE 
invites input from scholars from all of the above, including – but not limited to – 
political science, law, anthropology, finance, geography and history. 
The faculty lectures spanned a wide range of topics. Mahbubani (2008) gave 
an inaugural lecture on the challenges of global governance. Neo (2008) pre-
sented the success story of Singapore’s adaptive education policy and its Ministry 
of Education. The limits of risk management in an age of rapid financial innova-
tion were discussed by Mohrman (2008), while Araral (2008) talked about the 
institutional dynamics that govern small and medium-scale irrigation infrastruc-
ture in the Philippines. Simpser (2008a) discussed the unintended consequences 
of election monitoring. He also gave a second presentation (Simpser, 2008b) 
which elaborated on a theory of corrupt elections. Gehlbach presented a co-
authored paper (Gehlbach et al. 2008) on the impact of the size of state bureauc-
racy on the effectiveness of privatisation in post-communist Russia. Florini 
(2008) talked about the role of global institutions in the context of managing 
climate change. Shirley (2008) gave an overview of the broad topic of ‘institu-
tions and development’. Hill (2008a, b) delivered a lecture on property rights in 
the American Old West (late 19th century) and another on water rights. Social 
security reform was discussed by Asher (2008). Finally, the regulation of medical 
licences in the US was the topic presented by Law (2008). 
3. SELECTED PRESENTATIONS 
To give an indication of the quality of the papers presented during the workshop, 
the papers of Gehlbach, Brown and Earle (2008) and Decker and Lim (2008), 
representing faculty and participants respectively, are discussed below. The 
former was presented by Scott Gehlbach and the latter by Jamus Jerome Lim. 
—————————————————— 
6 For example, Cordeiro (2008), on constitutional changes, the contents of constitutions 
and their development impacts; Haldar (2008), providing a critical comparison of the 
institutional models of Nobel Peace Prize winner Muhammad Yunus and Peruvian economist 
Hernando de Soto; Paloyo (2008), on family-controlled corporations, private benefits of control 
and legal institutions; Sato (2008), on the phenomenon of donor developing countries in Asia 
and its implications for Japan as the principal donor country in the region. 
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3.1 Privatisation and bureaucracy in post-communist Russia 
The central question in the paper of Gehlbach et al. (2008) is ‘why have economic 
reforms aimed at reducing the role of the state in the economy been successful in 
some institutional environments but not others?’ In their paper ‘Helping Hand or 
Grabbing Hand? State Bureaucracy and Privatization Effectiveness’, Gehlbach and 
his colleagues use a rich dataset from Russia and subject it to panel econometric 
techniques to draw a counterintuitive conclusion: ‘Privatization has a more positive 
effect on firm performance in regions with relatively large state bureaucracies.’ 
The result is contrary to intuition because of the way bureaucrats have been 
characterised in economic literature, particularly in transition economies such as 
Russia. Gehlbach et al. (2008) note: ‘To the extent that each additional bureaucrat 
acts as a “toll taker” whose approval is necessary to engage in private economic 
activity, these pathologies should be exacerbated when bureaucracies are large.’ 
The pathologies referred to include rent-seeking behaviour which bureaucrats are 
expected to exhibit and which managers of private corporations face when they 
interact with the state. If bureaucrats are not actively engaged in rent-seeking, they 
may simply be incompetent – either way, bureaucratic interference (deliberate or 
otherwise) will likely increase the marginal cost of performance-enhancing 
measures planned by owners and managers of privatised corporations such that ‘in 
the limit, [bureaucracy] might prevent any improvements from taking place.’ 
Gehlbach et al. (2008) observe the opposite (Table 1). Larger bureaucracies, 
particularly regional, executive-branch ones, actually improve the performance of 
privatised enterprises, as measured by the value of output net of taxes. They offer 
two explanations for this result and ultimately reject the former in favour of the 
latter: ‘privatisation implementation’ and ‘post-privatisation business environ-
ment’. The first takes into account that the method of privatisation itself (and the 
resulting owners of privatised firms) may be different across regions in Russia, 
i.e., a ‘self-selection problem’ in the terminology of economists. The second 
focuses on differences in the prevailing business environments after privatisation 
across regions. The data do not support the hypothesis that differences in imple-
mentation account for the positive effect of larger regional executive 
bureaucracies. Using another dataset,7 however, the researchers have been able to 
provide some evidence that larger regional executive bureaucracies support better 
business environments for privatised firms.8 
—————————————————— 
7 For most of their paper, Gehlbach et al. use data from the Federal State Statistics Service 
(Rosstat). To test the hypothesis that the post-privatisation business environment is driving their 
main result, they switch to data from the Business Environment and Enterprise Performance 
Survey (BEEPS) of the World Bank. 
8 Due to data constraints, the authors note that the rejection of the ‘privatisation 
implementation’ hypothesis and the mild acceptance of the ‘post-privatisation business 
environment’ hypothesis should be taken with a grain of salt. 
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Table 1: State bureaucracy and privatisation effectiveness 
Independent variable Estimated coefficient Standard error 
(Log) Federal executive bureaucracy 0.005 0.145 
(Log) Regional executive bureaucracy 0.265*** 0.094 
(Log) Bureaucracy, other branches 0.056 0.112 
(Log) Population -0.204* 0.104 
(Log) Income per capita -0.012 0.052 
Urbanisation 0.582*** 0.173 
Autonomous region 0.098** 0.041 
Constant -1.835*** 0.517 
Notes: 
The dependent variable is region-specific privatisation effect. 
***, **, and * indicate statistical significant at 1, 5, and 10 percent levels, respectively. 
Source: Gehlbach et al. (2008). 
 
As the title of their paper suggests, the state bureaucracy can either be a ‘help-
ing hand’, facilitating privatisation and profitable conduct of business, or a 
‘grabbing hand’, stifling productivity by increasing transaction costs. They note 
that, at least in post-communist Russia, regional state executives offer a helping 
hand to private enterprises. While this is a valuable insight in and of itself, the 
paper falls short of answering a (.perhaps) more important question: what is it that 
makes bureaucrats offer a helping instead of a grabbing hand? Furthermore, what 
makes a larger bureaucracy more conducive to private business than a smaller 
bureaucracy? Gehlbach et al. note that ‘it appears that [the frustrations of private 
firms in Russia in dealing with public officials] may be smaller in regions where 
there are more bureaucrats with which to work’, but as to why working with more 
bureaucrats can help rather than suppress private initiatives is unclear. 
The preceding discussion does not mean to imply that the researchers are ig-
norant of these deficiencies. They are fully aware of the gap that must be filled. In 
their conclusion, they specify the next step, which is to study ‘the particular 
mechanisms by which state bureaucracy influences privatization effectiveness, 
and economic reform more generally.’ The question of whether the business 
environment in a country is conducive or deleterious is crucial in the light of what 
economic historians have shown: ‘[i]nstitutions that enabled markets underpinned 
economic success stories; institutions that stifled markets accomplished stagna-
tion.’ (Fabella, 2008). 
3.2 Growth and democracy 
The presentation of Jamus Jerome Lim is based on a co-authored paper (Decker 
and Lim, 2008). The question they pose is: what fundamentally drives growth? In 
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a workshop on institutional analysis the answer is obvious: institutions. But 
Decker and Lim go deeper by examining what particular institutions, and – in 
their words – by ‘unpacking’ this amorphous concept. Their taxonomy of 
institutions consists of two parts: ‘political’ and ‘political-economic’ institutions. 
The first has to do with ‘societal representations’ (e.g., ‘checks and balances, 
electoral rules, and federalism’); the second with those that ‘govern economic 
norms and rules’ (e.g., ‘legal frameworks, bureaucratic efficacy, curbs on 
corruption, and regulatory burden’). This is distinct from the Northian taxonomy 
that classifies institutions into two types: (1) those that affect transaction costs, 
and (2) those that involve property rights (Fabella, 2008). 
At least one of their results is controversial: democracy is neither necessary 
nor sufficient for development, as measured by GDP per capita. They quote the 
former Prime Minister of Singapore, Lee Kuan Yew, who is credited as the 
architect of Singapore’s dramatic transformation: ‘What a country needs to 
develop is discipline more than democracy. The exuberance of democracy leads 
to indiscipline and disorderly conduct which are inimical to development.’9 
Decker and Lim (2008) point out that it is not a priori obvious that a democracy 
should grow faster than a non-democracy. Illustrative examples include China, 
Malaysia, Singapore, Tunisia, Kuwait and Bahrain. The rapid development of 
these countries calls into question the consensus in the Western world that 
democracy is part and parcel to development. 
Decker and Lim reached their remarkable conclusion by subjecting a con-
structed panel dataset to two estimation methods: (1) by estimating a static model 
using an instrumental-variable approach, and (2) by estimating a dynamic model 
using the system generalised method of moments. The first method takes into 
account any endogeneity problem that is likely to arise in a regression between 
democracy and development. The second method is employed to properly 
account for dynamics in the model. Both estimates were checked for the robust-
ness of results by changing measures and specifications, and the results from both 
strategies generally stand up to the tests. What was left after the battery of 
robustness checks are the following conclusions: (1) that democracy has no 
significant impact on a country’s development, and (2) that political-economic 
institutions have a positive and significant impact on a country’s development. 
The danger in papers such as this lies in the policy implications that may be 
derived not only by the careless but, more menacingly, by the malicious. Fortu-
nately, Decker and Lim are neither. They quote noted trade economist Jagdish N. 
Bhagwati: ‘Democracy is not necessarily better for development. Only when 
—————————————————— 
9 Interestingly, Lee Kuan Yew made this statement in a speech in Manila, the Philippines, 
in 1992 at the invitation of the Philippine Chamber of Commerce and Industry. He noted that 
an ‘American-style constitution’ is the brick wall between the Philippines and development 
(McGurn, 1993). 
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combined with markets and openness does democracy offer the best prospect of 
achieving the efficient, dynamic society that allows development to thrive.’ The 
point is not that non-democracies grow faster than democracies (although some 
do, obviously) or that democracies should surrender their ideals to an autocrat; the 
point is that, in development, there is a persistent issue of sequencing. Perhaps 
non-democracies should pursue other things first, such as enforcement of property 
rights, before representation in Congress (or Parliament, if one prefers). The 
question of what poor democracies should do – and in this respect countries like 
the Philippines come to mind – is left unanswered. However, it seems that 
democratic ideals are still highly regarded, even by those who find that democ-
racy is inconsequential for development: 
While it is tempting to claim the policy implication that promoting democratic 
development is therefore irrelevant, doing so would disregard the tremendous 
value afforded – in terms of individual freedom and political representation – 
by democracy per se. It seems unwise to substitute such intangibles in favor of 
growth, at any cost. (Decker and Lim, 2008) 
4. CONCLUSION 
An observation often made during the workshop, attributed to John V.C. Nye of 
Washington University at St. Louis by Mary M. Shirley, is that ‘we are all 
institutionalists now’. This is a testament to the pervasiveness of New Institu-
tional Economics in the study of development. Twenty-five years ago, ‘North and 
his coworkers were flirting with heresy’ (Fabella, 2008). Now, very little doubt 
remains (if any at all) about the claim that the fundamental driver of growth is 
institutions. 
Asia is a region where the sharp divide between countries with ‘good’ institu-
tions and those with ‘bad’ ones could not be more vivid, especially if we consider 
starkly opposing countries like the Philippines and Singapore. While the latter has 
leapfrogged over everybody else in the region, ‘[the Philippines’] march to the 
bottom of the Asian league continues’ (Fabella, 2008). The magnitude of the 
difference is amplified when one considers the fact that, about 55 years ago, 
Singapore was a ‘riot-ridden, malaria-infested tropical island (Decker and Lim, 
2008) while the Philippines was next only to Japan in terms of real gross domes-
tic product (RGDP) per capita.10 (Heston et al., 2006). In 2007, Singapore’s RGDP 
—————————————————— 
10  Note that Singapore was not yet independent at that time, so we compare the Philippines 
and Malaysia. If one compares the Philippines with Singapore in 1960 (the earliest year for 
which the Penn World Table has data for that country), Singapore has about double the RGDP 
per capita. 
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per capita stood at US$ 48,900, which is almost 15 times larger than the Philip-
pines’ US$ 3,300 (CIA, 2008). 
The difference lies in institutions. While it is true that proximate causes.11 of 
growth have remained significant in standard growth regressions by economists, 
recent work, as exemplified by the participants during the workshop, has instead 
focused on the social fabric upon which markets rest. Much of the work over the 
last 30 years has ‘reaffirmed Adam Smith’s faith in the market and private 
initiative as the engine of growth [but] North and [his] co-workers revealed [that] 
the shafts and cylinders of that market engine’ are made up of institutions 
(Fabella, 2008). Another economist notes that institutions matter so much ‘that 
not paying attention to institutions, said [John] Nye, is like missing the economic 
forest for the statistical trees’ (Collas-Monsod, 2008). 
Table 2: Expatriate perceptions of corruption in Asia 
Territory 2006 2007 2008 
China 7.58 6.29 7.93 
Hong Kong 3.13 1.87 1.80 
India 6.76 6.67 7.25 
Indonesia 8.16 8.03 7.98 
Japan 3.01 2.10 2.25 
Macau 4.78 5.18 3.30 
Malaysia 6.13 6.25 6.37 
Philippines 7.80 9.40 9.00 
Singapore 1.30 1.20 1.13 
South Korea 5.44 6.30 5.65 
Taiwan 5.91 6.23 6.55 
Thailand 7.64 8.03 8.00 
Vietnam 7.91 7.54 7.75 
Average 5.81 5.78 5.77 
Notes: 
Grades range from 0 to 10, with 10 as the worst. 
Source: Pabico (2008). 
 
It should be obvious that for institutions to propel growth, they must function 
well. On the one hand, thanks to the Americans, ‘Filipinos were electing the 
lower house of a bicameral national legislature as early as 1907, and then began 
electing the upper house in 1916’ (Nelson, 2007). As Asia’s oldest democracy, 
—————————————————— 
11  By this, we mean capital stock, infrastructure and a similar assortment of other metrics. 
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what does the Philippines have to show for it? ‘The country is a pit of institutional 
dysfunction’ (Fabella, 2008). On the other hand, Singapore, which ranks 141st 
among 169 countries in the 2007 edition of the Press Freedom Index of Reporters 
sans Frontières (the Philippines is ranked 128th), has one of the lowest crime 
rates in the world and corruption in government and the rest of the civil service is 
virtually unheard of. In a survey of expatriate businessmen’s perception of 
corruption in the region conducted by the Hong Kong-based Political and 
Economic Risk Consultancy, Singapore has consistently outperformed other 
countries since the survey was initiated in 1997 (Pabico, 2008). In the past two 
years, the Philippines has been viewed as the most corrupt country, overtaking 
Indonesia in 2007 (Table 2). This has led some commentators to say that ‘what 
the Philippines has is not a democracy but a vote’12 (McGurn, 1993). 
Lessons from the Asian experience can have wide applicability elsewhere. The 
RCI recognises this and, two months after its first workshop in Asia, held a 
second one in Los Baños, the Philippines, in partnership with the Philippine 
Economic Society, the Southeast Asia Regional Centre for Graduate Study and 
Research in Agriculture, and the Friedrich Naumann Foundation. No doubt, 
another group of researchers will benefit from the focus on institutional analysis 
afforded by this workshop. Economists and other scholars from allied fields 
would be remiss if they failed to incorporate the impact of institutions into their 
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